INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the federal government provided a $17 billion subsidy to the nation's charitable organizations 2 3 Although corporations are permitted a similar deduction, this Comment will discuss only the deduction for individuals. See I.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. III 1991 (stating that corporations may make deductions for charitable contributions). The total amount of the tax expenditure for the charitable contributions of corporations is quite small in comparison to that for individuals. See ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at 15-16 (estimating that corporate donations will account for only 8%, or $1.5 billion, of the total $19.3 billion tax expenditure for charitable contribution deductions in 1993). It also does not appear that the issues presented in this Comment arise in the context of corporate charitable contributions. 4 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution .... ."). A deduction is a reduction in "gross income in arriving at net income for tax purposes." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 413 (6th ed. 1990).
' Charitable organizations must satisfy the requirements of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Such organizations must be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster ... amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.., and [must] not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign .... " Id. The IRS publishes a two-volume list of all organizations that qualify for the deduction. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS (1992) . Over 200,000 organizations are listed rangingfrom the AAA Scholarship Fund of the Lehigh Valley (2371) charitable organizations through the allowance of a deduction is an example of a tax expenditure. 6 Permitting a deduction against taxable income operates as a subsidy to charitable organizations by reducing the taxes of individuals who contribute to those organizations.
For example, if a taxpayer at the 15% marginal tax rate 7 is entitled to deduct the $100 that she donated to a qualified charity, then the deduction reduces her taxable income by $100 and her tax liability by $15,8 lowering the net opportunity cost of her charitable contribution to $85. Assuming the taxpayer was prepared originally to make a donation of $100 without a tax subsidy, the presence of the tax subsidy will induce her to increase her donation to $118, because a donation of that amount will reduce her tax liability by $18, 9 returning the net cost of her donation to $100.10 Empirical research bears out the assumption that the existence of a deduction will induce taxpayers, on average, to increase their contributions
Motor Club to the Zuni Canyon Institute and representing viewpoints as potentially adverse as the Right to Life Education Committee and the Pro-Choice Education Society. See 1 id. at 1; 2 id. at 449, 502, 956. 6 "'Tax Expenditures' are defined... as reductions in individual and corporate income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions .... These special tax provisions can take the form of exclusions, credits, deductions, preferential tax rates, or deferrals of tax liability." ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at 2. Whatever their form, tax expenditures "are considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be viewed as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives ....
They are a measure of the economic benefits that are provided through the tax laws to various.., sectors of the economy." Id. Reducing tax revenue by allowing a deduction from taxable income is an alternative to collecting the money in tax revenue and then spending it on the sector of the economy benefitted by the deduction. In the case of charitable contribution deductions, charitable organizations are the benefactors.
7 A taxpayer's marginal tax rate is the "tax rate on the last dollar of taxable income." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1462. For example, if a taxpayer faces a marginal tax rate of 20%, her next dollar of income increases her taxes by 20 cents. Contrast a taxpayer's average rate-the percentage of tax paid with respect to income as a whole. For instance, if a taxpayer has income of $20,000 and pays taxes of $4,000, her average rate is 20% ($4,000 divided by $20,000 equals 20%). ' The following example is illustrative. If the taxpayer has taxable income of $20,000 and faces a marginal (and average) tax rate of 15%, her resulting total tax liability is $3000 ($20,000 multiplied by 15% equals $3000). If she donates $100 to charity and is entitled to a deduction, her taxable income reduces to $19,900 and her corresponding tax liability to $2985 ($19,900 multiplied by 15% equals $2985). The $15 decrease in her tax liability from $3000 to $2985 is equal to the amount of the deduction, $100, times the marginal tax rate of 15%.
9 The $118 deductible donation multiplied by her 15% tax rate is approximately equivalent to an $18 tax savings.
10 The $100 net cost of her donation is computed by subtracting the $18 tax savings from her $118 donation. rather than simply pocketing the tax savings. 11 Thus, the federal government has in effect donated money to the charitable organization through its allowance of a deduction, inducing an increase in the charitable organization's receipts from $100 to $118.
Perhaps more importantly is the mechanism by which this subsidy to charitable organizations is provided. Generally, Congress allocates government money among competing interests; here, the individual taxpayer chooses how to allocate public money ($18 in the preceding example) by deciding which charitable organization she wishes to support. This power, however, is not extended to all taxpayers. Under the current Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), only taxpayers who itemize deductions are entitled to deduct charitable contributions from their taxable income. 12 Since highincome taxpayers are most likely to be itemizers, 13 they have the greatest voice in selecting which charitable organizations receive government subsidies through the current tax deduction mechanism. In addition, charitable organizations receiving -donations from high-income taxpayers enjoy a larger subsidy than that provided by low-income taxpayers because the marginal tax rate for high-income taxpayers is higher under our current progressive rate structure.
14 11 See infra part II.C.3. In fact, this research indicates that the effect of the tax subsidy on such a taxpayer would actually induce her to increase her donation by more than $18, even though this would increase her net cost above the $100 she was originally willing to give. See infra part II.C.3. Thus, contributions to charity are increased by an amount greater than the decrease in taxes resulting from the deduction. See infra part II.C.3; see also Under the present system a low-income taxpayer who does not itemize deductions and contributes $100 to a qualified charity will bear the full cost of her donation, since she will pay the same total federal income tax whether or not she contributes the $100. In contrast, a high-income taxpayer who itemizes deductions and faces the highest marginal tax rate of 31% is entitled to deduct the $100 contribution in calculating her taxable income, decreasing her tax liability by $31. The government subsidizes 31% of the high-income taxpayer's contribution but none of the low-income taxpayer's contribution. This effect magnifies the disparity between the government's subsidy of the two taxpayers' chosen charities. The higher-income taxpayer is now willing to donate more than $100 because the contribution "costs less," thereby giving the charitable organization an even greater subsidy. Meanwhile, the low-income taxpayer's chosen charity receives no subsidy for her contribution.
As this example illustrates, the current system is really an inequitable "upside-down subsidy."
15
The ultimate result of channeling government funds to charitable organizations through the mechanism of an itemized deduction is that predominantly highincome taxpayers decide which charitable organizations are entitled to the $17 billion of federal money expended.1 6 Low-income taxpayers are denied a voice in this decision. The present tax system provides no subsidy to the charities of the more than twentytwo million households that do not earn enough to file a tax return, 1 7 nor does it subsidize the contributions of the seventyeight million households (71% of all federal taxpayers) who file returns but do not itemize deductions. 
U.S.C.).
20 See id. § § 13201, 13202 (raising the highest marginal tax rate to 36% for single taxpayers with taxable income exceeding $115,000 ($140,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns) and establishing a "high income" surtax on individuals with taxable income in excess of $250,000, raising the effective marginal rate for such taxpayers to 39.6%).
21 For the sake of example, this Comment will assume a 20% credit. The 20% figure is a rough estimate of the level of credit needed to maintain the current revenue cost and total level of charitable giving. See infra note 127.
22 A deduction has no value to an individual with no tax liability. A refundable credit, by contrast, entitles an individual to receive a cash payment from the Treasury in the amount that the credit exceeds his tax liability. The current earned income tax credit to low-income individuals who maintain households for their minor children is an example of a refundable tax credit. See I.R.C. § 32 (Supp. III 1991).
23 Some critics may argue that even an equal credit provided for the donations of both low-and high-income taxpayers will still result in the government disproportionately subsidizing the philanthropic decisions of high-income taxpayers, because the total amount of an individual's contributions and the corresponding subsidy to the charitable organization will increase with income. See PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REv. 85, 96 n.41 (1985) (citing studies which indicate a positive income elasticity for charitable giving). For example, under a credit system of 20% if an individual earning $100,000 donates $1000, and an individual earning $10,000 donates $100, the higher-income taxpayer will designate a subsidy of $200, 10 times that of the lower-income taxpayer's $20, though they both receive an equal 20% subsidy in percentage terms. The fact that the amount of an individual's donation increases with income exacerbates the inequity of the current
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If we accept former President Bush's oft-quoted analogy that the private philanthropy of our nation's individuals is akin to "a thousand points of light," 24 current government policy can be viewed as disproportionately supporting the points of light of our nation's wealthiest. If the philanthropic light of individuals across income levels is viewed as a spectrum, the current system fails to provide support for the light provided by the low-income portion of the spectrum. A change to a refundable tax credit will grant equal support for the philanthropic light of all Americans regardless of income, and encourage an entire spectrum of charitable giving.
Part I of this Comment presents an overview of the historical development of the tax treatment of charitable contributions. Part II examines the alternative theoretical and policy rationales underlying the income tax treatment of contributions by individuals to charitable organizations. Part III provides an example of the current system and critiques its plutocratic nature. In Part IV, this Comment proceeds to examine alternatives to the current system, considering a system of direct matching grants, a deduction for nonitemizers as set forth in a bill currently before Congress, 25 and finally, the most desirable alternative, proposing a revenue-neutral change to a refundable tax credit.
system. This problem could be resolved by decreasing the credit as income rises. In our preceding example, the inequity could be eliminated by entitling the lowerincome taxpayer to a credit of 20% and the higher-income taxpayer a credit of 2%.
This Comment chooses not to advocate a credit that decreases as income rises. Arguably, a large part of the inequity of the current system arises from a framework that treats the individual contribution decisions of taxpayers differently depending on one's income. The current system does not provide equal treatment for all individuals under the law. A flat credit would equally subsidize the individual philanthropic decision of each taxpayer irrespective of income.
24 See The Inauguration of George Bush, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1989, at 20. 25 See H.R. 152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (stating its purpose as "to restore and make permanent" I.R.C. § 170(i) allowing a "deduction for charitable contributions by nonitemizers"). The presence of this bill is a hopeful sign of reform since congressional attention has been drawn to the issue. Senator Moynihan's rise to chairman of the Senate Finance Committee also increases the possibility of a reform of the tax funding of charitable organizations. See Rick Wartzman, Charities Cheer, WALL ST.J., Dec. 16, 1992, at Al (describingMoynihan as the "best friend charity has ever seen" and as an individual who "once championed letting nonitemizers make charitable deductions").
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF INDIVDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
The tax preference granted individual contributions to charitable organizations has a long history in the federal income tax law. 26 The introduction of the standard deduction in 194427 and its expansion in 1986, however, effectively eliminated the subsidy to charitable organizations for a majority of taxpayers, removing the opportunity for many middle-and low-income taxpayers to deduct their contributions. 28 The adverse effect of the standard deduc- 27 Added during World War II, a time of increased income tax coverage of the citizenry, the standard deduction was advocated as a means of simplifying compliance for the multitude of lower-income taxpayers added to the tax rolls. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 25, 32 (explaining that the standard deduction was added in hope that it would "achieve high compliance with a minimum of administration").
28 Whether or not the inability of low-and middle-income taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions should be viewed as inequitable depends upon the rationale behind the standard deduction. If the rationale behind the charitable contribution deduction is not income measurement, see infra part II.A., then the standard deduction could be viewed as a substitute for only those expenses which are deductible because the government wishes to accurately measure taxable income, and not for those which are deductible because the government wishes to encourage a particular activity, such as charitable giving. See infra part II.B.
In addition, if the standard deduction is considered a substitute for a taxpayer's itemized deduction, then the disallowance of a deduction to nonitemizers isjustified on the grounds that their deduction for charitable contributions is included within the standard deduction. If, however, the purpose of the standard deduction is to remove lower-income taxpayers from the tax rolls, as was a "heralded" consequence of the 1986 Act, then the disallowance of a tax preference for nonitemizers cannot be justified. See GRAETz, supra note 14, at 508. For instance, in 1992 the standard deduction was $3600 for a single person. If a taxpayer had $300 of charitable contribution deductions, and $1000 of other qualified itemized deductions, the standard deduction would provide a $2300 benefit in the form of an additional deduction ifviewed as a substitute for an insufficient amount ofitemized deductions.
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The proposal brought on a storm of opposition on the basis that the incentive effect of the charitable deduction would be lost. Representative Carl Curtis stated, "[t]his bill, when carried into effect, means that the individual who gives a portion of his hardearned money in contributions will have the same amount of taxes withheld from his wages as if he had given nothing." 29 Nevertheless, the desire for simplification triumphed over concerns regarding the demise of the incentive effect.
8 0 Also in the name of simplification, the Tax Reform Act of 19861 ("1986 Act") further decreased the number of itemizers, and thus, the number of taxpayers capable of indirectly creating subsidies for charities by taking the charitable contribution deduction.3 2 Even before the 1986 Act, to counteract the erosion of the subsidy, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198133 included a provision which phased in a deduction for nonitemizers3 4 Although this provision expired in 1986,3 s there is currently a bill before Congress which proposes to re-establish such a deduction.
6
If the standard deduction of $3600 is viewed, when combined with the personal exemption of $2300, as a mechanism to eliminate individual taxpayers with less than $5900 of income from the tax rolls, then the disproportionate treatment of nonitemizers' contributions is not justified. 
.).
32 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 13, at 2 (stating that the number of taxpayers who itemized deductions decreased by 20% from 1985 to 1988); GRAETZ, supra note 14, at 508 (noting that the 1986 Act was designed to decrease the number of itemizers through the increase in the amount of the standard deduction, the disallowance of consumer interest deductions, and the imposition of a 2% adjusted gross income floor on miscellaneous deductions). 
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II. THE ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES BEHIND THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

A. Andrews's Income Measurement Approach
The deduction for contributions to charitable organizations is predicated on two alternative rationales. One justification is that it is necessary to accurately measure an individual's income, since the portion donated to charity is not available for personal consumption or savings. 37 Defining income as the amount of a person's consumption plus the change in her wealth, 3 8 Andrews asserts that gifts to charity should not be considered consumption. He argues that if the income tax is viewed as a mechanism to "divert economic resources away from personal consumption and accumulation" to public use, 3 9 then only the consumption of resources which divert "economic resources away from other people [should be considered consumption] in assessing income taxes." 40 REV. 309, 312 (1972) .
38 This widely-accepted definition of income is attributed to Robert Haig and Henry Simons. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) ("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. 41 Public goods are those commodities or services that, when purchased, provide benefits to nonpurchasers. Such goods are characterized by "nonrival consumption" (consumption by one person does not reduce the benefit available to others) and "nonexclusion" (an inability to practically exclude the external benefits). See ROYJ.
RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 452-53 (3d ed. 1988).
The unique nature of public goods creates the "free-rider problem," which causes the market to undersupply such goods. "A free rider is anyone who enjoys the benefits of a good or service without paying the cost." Id. at 454. The market is unwilling to supply goods on which individuals can "free ride." The government, on the other hand, is able to provide such goods because it can compel payment for their costs by employing its taxing power.
Education, for instance, is often thought of as a good that results in benefits to nonpurchasers. Because the benefit of an educated populace can be enjoyed even by those who do not pay the costs of education, society's demand for education is not fully reflected in its market price. Only through government intervention is the full 
B. The Deduction as a Tax Subsidy
An alternative and, this Comment will argue, superior view of the tax preference for charitable donations is that the favorable treatment of individual donations exists to provide a subsidy to charitable organizations because these organizations furnish public goods. The tax subsidy is an alternative to direct government provision of such goods.
Andrews's view that a deduction is necessary for the accurate measurement of taxable income has been appropriately criticized as merely "repackag[ing] the arguments for subsidizing charities," 43 or "flip[ping] the argument for subsidizing charities on its head." 44 Andrews presupposes that charitable organizations are deserving of public support, since they provide public goods. He then incorpodemand for education reflected in the price and the proper amount of education provided. Similarly, it has been argued that the government should subsidize the war on poverty, because a reduction in the higher crime rate and animosity associated with divergent wealth allocation is a public good unlikely to be adequately provided by the private market. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 465 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that "there are free-rider problems" that support "an argument for forcing people to contribute to the alleviation of poverty so that they cannot take a free ride on private donations to charity").
Services provided by charitable organizations are in the nature of public goods. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 94. Wiedenbeck gives the examples of the services provided by hospitals, museums, and colleges. He argues that there would be inadequate consumption of such services if they were available only to those who could afford to pay a price reflecting the full price. See id. Thus, government support is "based on a social policy decision that such cultural and educational opportunities should be available" to more people than "free market pricing would permit." Id. Charities which provide services to the poor are also providing a public good. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra, at 457 (arguing that " [t] he welfare of those with strong altruistic feelings towards the poor will be improved by a redistribution of income in favor of the poor" and that private insurance cannot solve the problem of poverty since the market does not provide "'poverty' insurance, even though random events such as bad health, technological progress, accidents, and changes in taste can cause poverty"). For example, the Salvation Army provides food and shelter to the downtrodden, providing a social good by, among other things, alleviating some of the costs poverty imposes on society.
42 See Andrews, supra note 37, at 356. rates this presumption into his definition of income, excluding from income those expenses he deems worthy of a subsidy.
45
The alternative view simply makes explicit what is implicit in Andrews's view. Charitable giving is viewed as an item of "discretionary spending that warrants an incentive." 46 The tax deduction for charitable contributions merely encourages people to "do voluntarily what we would otherwise have to coerce them to do (i.e., fund collective goods)." 47 This conception of the deduction as a subsidy of charitable giving is consistent with the view among some economists that charity is a form of personal consumption. 48 If charitable giving is considered as a form of personal consumption, then it is properly included in income, 49 with a deduction viewed as providing a subsidy for this preferable form of consumption. The importance of this distinction is as follows: if the deduction is necessary for the proper measurement of income, as Andrews suggests, then a credit or any other alternative subsidy mechanism is inappropriate because the lack of a deduction overstates taxable income. If, on the other hand, the deduction exists simply to subsidize charitable organizations and not to measure income, then the "form of [the] tax subsidy is not determined a priori, but rather is a question subject to normative policy analysis." 50 Thus, because the deduction is properly conceptualized as a tax subsidy, we are free to consider policy considerations when deciding which mechanism should be used to provide the subsidy.
C. Direct Budget Outlays or Indirect Subsidy?
If the current deduction for charitable donations is seen as a means of subsidizing the provision of public goods by charitable organizations, is it preferable for government to support the provision of such goods through direct budget outlays to particular 
Cultural Pluralism
The first argument in support of a tax subsidy approach is that it encourages, unlike direct government expenditure, cultural pluralism.
5 1 The recipients of direct government expenditures are chosen through a majoritarian process, "which may lead to a tyranny of the majority. For example, if the voting population likes public TV but doesn't like fine art or music, government-only support through the tax and appropriation process would result in a uniform, perhaps stifling, set of cultural and educational opportunities."
52 In contrast, support of art, music, religion, education, and other social services via a tax subsidy allocates budgetary priorities through a system which funds the individual choices of the populace. "The deduction encourages pluralism by permitting an assortment of social services; taxpayers are allowed in part to vote with their dollars, rather than by the one-person, one-vote system that establishes ... budget priorities.
" 53
Many of the "meritorious social programs" currently provided for by the tax expenditure for charitable giving "as a political matter, could not be transplanted from the tax to the spending side of the federal budget." 54 The recent controversy over the direct public funding of controversial artistic works through the National Endowment for the Arts is a prime example of the problems caused by majoritarian control of public funding for charitable endeavors. 55 Under an indirect system of support, those individuals who want to fund charitable organizations that support controversial artistic works have the ability to allocate federal funds for that purpose through an indirect tax expenditure, ensuring a rich diversity of cultural endeavors not possible when funding decisions must be made by majoritarian choice. As Posner argues, the support of charities through a tax expenditure is "politically important because it transfers from the government to the individual taxpayer some of the power to decide who shall be recipients of altruistic transfers, a decision that in most societies is made at the political level." 5 6 Support of charitable organizations through a system of indirect support allows the donor to exercise "a form of self-government.., that parallels, complements and enriches the democratic electoral process itself" by "saying with SERFDOM (1944) (warning against such infringements). A broad array of social services could in theory be provided by charitable organizations supported by this pluralistic funding mechanism without the loss of individual freedom associated with majoritarian government control. Critics, however, lament this lack of majoritarian control. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 362 ("[It is argued that some of the functions now supported by charity should be the responsibility of the state and that allocations made from public funds ... should be subject to public discretion and scrutiny.").
58 Direct government support of religious organizations is constitutionally prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.... ."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (suggesting that a direct money subsidy to religious organizations "would be a relationship pregnant with involvement" that would violate the Establishment Clause).
The importance of the constitutionality of the deduction for religious contributions might be heightened under a tax credit system. A credit would increase the subsidy produced by low-income taxpayers, who disproportionately support reliious organizations. See infra part III.B. 9 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (considering the constitutionality of the property tax exemption granted to churches). ... and to "consider whether a nation committed to religious pluralism must, in the age of the affirmative state, make active provision for maximum diversity." 65 The charitable contribution deduction is such a provision, encouraging religious pluralism by subsidizing the myriad of individual decisions to contribute to diverse qualified religious organizations.
Finally, in addition to the value of diversity in its own right, it can be argued that religiously affiliated organizations deserve government support because they provide public goods. 66 Because it is based on the decisions of individuals, a tax subsidy allows the government to provide these types of public benefits while still ensuring individual religious freedom, including the freedom to contribute to organizations adverse to religion. 
Efficiency
A third reason justifying a tax subsidy is that it is efficient with respect to the amount of government cost required to fund charitable organizations. Empirical studies seem to indicate that the institution of a charitable contribution deduction induces an increase in the dollar amount of contributions to charity that is greater than the decrease in the dollar amount of tax revenues resulting from the deduction. In other words, most empirical studies indicate that the price elasticity 6 8 of charitable giving is
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUIoNAL LAW 1204 (2d ed. 1988).
66 Religion is generally seen as providing a beneficial community conscience, thereby enhancing the ability of individuals to peacefully coexist. See EDITH L. FIsCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 246 nn.10-13 (enumerating the benefits of religion to society). Religious organizations also provide needed community services. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) ("[Churches provide] social welfare services or 'good works,'.., family counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to children."); id. at 708 ("Churches perform some functions that a State would.., perform. I refer to nonsectarian social welfare operations such as the care of orphaned children and the destitute and people who are sick."); Gergen, supra note 43, at 1435 n.144 (" [O] 
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greater than one. 69 Thus, the cost to the government of indirect support of charitable organizations is less expensive than direct support.
70
Consider the following example: a taxpayer absent government support 7 l is willing to donate $1000 to charitable organizations. The government wants to support those charitable organizations in some manner, either directly or indirectly, and is willing to spend $300. Under a system of direct support, the cost to the government is simply the amount of its cash outlay to the organizations-$300. The charitable organization will receive $1300: $1000 from the taxpayer and $300 directly from the government.
If instead the government chooses to support the charitable organizations indirectly, through a tax credit of 20% for example, then its cost equals the resulting decrease in tax revenues. Under this indirect system, the taxpayer is induced to donate more to charity since the government is subsidizing a portion of the cost, in effect lowering the price of donating to charity. The resulting increase in the amount of her giving, however, will be larger than the tax subsidy she receives from the government, if we assume that the price elasticity is greater than one. If the price elasticity of charitable giving is one, the taxpayer increases her pre-tax giving to $1250.72 Since the price elasticity is greater than one, 73 however, a decrease in price. Consider, for example, a 20% decrease in the price of movies. If the decrease in the price induces you to attend 20% more movies, then your price elasticity for movies is 1. If you instead choose to attend 30% more movies, then your price elasticity is 1.5, an amount greater than 1. In the case of charitable giving, the "price" is the net cost of the donation after tax treatment. If this amount is reduced 20% through the allowance of a credit or a deduction, and the price elasticity is greater than 1, we would expect the amount of charitable giving to increase by an amount greater than 20%.
69 See Feldstein, supra note 11, at 122 (determining that the deduction encourages donors to give more than the amount of their tax savings); see also POSNER, supra note 41, at 469 ("The charitable deduction [is]... more efficient than direct government charitable giving in inducing charitable expenditures. If as some empirical studies have found the price elasticity of charitable giving is greater than one.., then the charitable deduction costs the Treasury less in lost revenue than charities gain in contributions."); Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 95 & n.41 (" [D] eductibility increases gifts to charity by more than it decreases tax collections.").
70 In addition, as part of the private sector, charitable organizations can perhaps provide public services more efficiently than the government. Any gains from the more efficient provision of services by private charitable organizations is in addition to the efficiency advantages of the tax expenditure for charitable giving outlined in this section.
71 A tax deduction, tax credit, or matching grant are all forms of government support. 12 One thousand two hundred fifty dollars is the amount at which the net cost of the taxpayer will increase her giving to an amount greater than $1250, perhaps $1500. 74 Thus, under a system of indirect support the charitable organizations will receive $1500, an increase of $200 over the direct system of support, while the cost to the government will remain at $300 ($1500 multiplied by the 20% credit). The credit, which reduces the cost of donating to charity, induces the taxpayer to make a net donation of $1200 ($1500 donation less the $300 credit)-$200 more than she otherwise would give. Multiplied by hundreds of thousands of taxpayers, the increase in aggregate charitable contributions becomes quite significant.
III. THE CURRENT INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
A. An Example Consider a $100 donation by three different taxpayers under the current system. Taxpayer I is a single taxpayer who works part-time at an urban convenience store. He had an AG1 75 of $5500 in 1992. Under 1992's. tax code, he had zero taxable income. 76 He also donated $100 to his church in 1992, roughly two dollars a week. He had to bear the full cost of his donation and received no governher donation remains at $1000. A $1250 contribution multiplied by a 20% tax credit equals a $250 reduction in tax liability. One thousand two hundred fifty dollars less the $250 reduction in her tax liability resulting from the credit equals her $1000 net cost of donation.
73 For an explanation of price elasticity, see supra note 68. 74 For this illustration, a price elasticity of 2.5 has been utilized: a 50% increase in giving from $1000 to $1500 over the 20% reduction in price (50% divided by 20% equals 2.5). The remainder of this Comment uses a price elasticity of approximately 1.33-a more realistic assumption. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 95 n.41 (citing numerous studies in this range). Note that the indirect outlay still proves more efficient even with a smaller price elasticity of 1.5. In this case, the taxpayer increases her giving by 30% to $1300 (30% increase in giving divided by a 20% decrease in price equals a price elasticity of 1.5). The charitable organization receives the same $1300 it receives under the direct outlay system, but the cost to the government is only $260 ($1300 contribution multiplied by a 20% tax credit equals a $260 reduction in tax revenue), rather than $300. It should be noted as well that the elasticity calculations in this Comment do not employ, for simplicity sake, the midpoints formula or some other mechanism to avoid the distortion associated with percentage changes in opposite directions. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 41, at 95 (describing the midpoints formula).
75 For a definition of AGI, see supra note 12. 76 His 1992 AGI is less than $5900-the sum of his standard deduction of $3600 plus his $2300 personal exemption. See supra note 12, for the definitions of standard deduction and personal exemption.
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Taxpayer II is single and is a nurse's aide in an urban hospital. She had an AGI of $20,000, and did not itemize. Her taxable income was $14,100. 77 She donated $100 to the homeless shelter she passes on her way to work in the mornings. Like Taxpayer I, she had to bear the full cost of her donation and received no government subsidy by way of a tax deduction. In her case, this occurred because she did not itemize her deductions, rather than as a result of her having no tax liability.
Taxpayer III is a single taxpayer who is a machinist in a factory. He had AGI of $32,000 in 1992, taxable income of roughly $2 1,000,78 and a marginal tax rate of 15%.
79
His donation of $100 went to the Salvation Army, which years earlier had helped him overcome his problem with alcohol abuse, enabling him to get back his job at the factory. This donation entitled him to increase his itemized deductions by $100, decreasing his taxable income by $100 and reducing his tax liability by $15. The available subsidy, however, induced him to increase the amount of his donation to $141.80 The government then subsidized his contribution through a reduction in his tax liability of $21.81 Thus, Taxpayer III not only received a government subsidy for his charitable contribution, unlike Taxpayers I and II, but the government also induced a $41 increase in the funding of his chosen charity, the Salvation Army. This increase cost the government only $21.82
Taxpayer IV is a single taxpayer who practices environmental law as an associate in a large urban law firm. She had an AGI of $100,000. She had taxable income of approximately $80,00083 and 77 Her taxable income equals her $20,000 AGI minus $5900 (her standard deduction of $3600 and her $2300 personal exemption). 80 With a price elasticity of 1.33, a 15% deduction will induce him to raise the amount of his giving by 20% to $120 from $100 (20% increase in contribution divided by a 15% decrease in the cost of the contribution equals a price elasticity of 1.33).
81 A donation of $141 multiplied by a 15% deduction equals a $21 decrease in tax liability.
82 Recall the efficiency of the deduction discussed supra part II.C.3. 83 An AGI of $100,000 minus a $2300 personal exemption and $17,670 in donated $100 to the local public television station, which broadcasts shows on the environment. This donation entitled her to reduce her tax liability by $31 because she was in the 31% marginal tax bracket. 84 Because she knew she would receive this subsidy, she raised the amount of her donation to $206,85 obtaining a deduction of $64. 86 In this case, the government increased the funding of the local public television station by $106 while incurring a cost of $64. It subsidized the donation of Taxpayer IV, a high-income taxpayer, by 31%,87 in contrast to 15% for Taxpayer III, and 0% for Taxpayers I and II. Adding up the results in each example shows that the total cost to the government was $85, which provided $147 in subsidies to the charitable organizations favored by Taxpayers III ($41 to the Salvation Army) and IV ($106 to the public television station). No government money was provided to the church or the homeless shelter favored by lower-income Taxpayers I and II. The total aggregate level of charitable giving was $547.88 estimated itemized deductions equals approximately $80,000. See MASTER TAX GUIDE, supra note 78, at 76 (estimating that the average itemized deduction for a taxpayer with AGI of $100,000).
8 A price elasticity of 1.33 and a 31% deduction will induce her to raise the net amount of her donation 42% to $142 from $100 (42% increase in contribution divided by a 31% decrease in the cost of the contribution equals a price elasticity of approximately 1.33). This assumes a constant price elasticity across income levels. For a discussion of this assumption, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
8 A $206 contribution multiplied by a 31% marginal tax rate equals a $64 reduction in tax liability and a net contribution of $142 (a $206 contribution minus $64 of tax savings).
87 The phase out of itemized deductions for taxpayers with AGI in excess of $105,250 in 1992 can lower the marginal benefit of a deduction for a charitable contribution to potentially as little as 6% (20% of 31%) for high-income taxpayers affected by the phase out. See I.R.C. § 68 (Supp. III 1991) (decreasing the amount of itemized deductions by the smaller of 3% of the excess AGI over $105,250 or 80% of total itemized deductions). In a typical case, however, the marginal benefit of an additional donation for taxpayers subject to the phase out remains at 31%. For example, consider the marginal benefit of an additional $1000 charitable contribution by a hypothetical taxpayer with AGI of $250,000 and itemized deductions of $48,000. See MASTER TAX GUIDE, supra note 78, at 76 (estimating that the average itemized deduction for a taxpayer with AGI of $250,000). Before the $1000 contribution, § 68 calls for the amount of itemized deductions to be reduced by $4342-the lesser of $38,400 (80% of $48,000) or $4342 ($250,000 minus $105,250 multiplied by 3%). After the $1000 contribution deduction, the reduction of itemized deductions resulting from § 68 remains at $4342-the lesser of $39,200 (80% of $49,000) or $4342 ($250,000 minus $105,250 multiplied by 3%). Thus, the marginal benefit of a charitable deduction for this hypothetical taxpayer would still be 31%, since the $1000 contribution deduction would increase her itemized deductions bya full $1000, reducing her tax liability by $310.
" The sum of the $100 donated by Taxpayers I and II, $141 by Taxpayer III, and 2390 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 2371
B. A Plutocracy-A Critique of the Current System
As previously mentioned, one benefit of an indirect subsidy is that it acts as a mechanism for the pluralistic allocation of budgetary priorities.
8 9 Under the current system, however, this "pluralism"
represents only the budgetary preferences of those with enough income to enjoy the subsidy. Although the system can still be called a form of self-government allowing individuals to say "what needs should be met, what objectives pursued, [and] what values served," 90 it is an extremely inequitable form of self-government because it allocates the right to self-govern on the basis of income. Those with low income have little or no voice in allocation decisions and those with the highest income have the greatest input.
Thus, the current system fails to realize the potential for cultural pluralism inherent in the provision of public goods through a tax subsidy, and instead creates a system far worse than the political majoritarian decisionmaking of direct government expenditures. Rather than allocating budgetary outlays on the basis of the individual decisions of each citizen, a possibility if the tax benefits were available to all, it allocates the funding decision only to a very small portion of society, those with the highest income. This allocation of decisionmaking is inequitable. If individuals are to have the power to decide how public money is spent, then that power should be allocated without regard to an individual's income.
The power conferred upon high-income Americans by their ability to allocate public funds through tax deductible charitable contributions 91 is most aptly described in the context of the private foundation:
[W]e have to acknowledge the fact that private economic power is being deployed, often dynastically, through the device of the charitable foundation and the power it gives the founder and the founder's family to select the objects of their charitable bounty and to manage the charitable assets. 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTIONS
The power vested in high-income Americans by the current tax deduction also creates an opportunity to enjoy reciprocity for one's philanthropy. 93 One view of charity is that it is support offered under the "consideration that help may be returned" in some less direct form. 94 Under this view, philanthropy is granted not just for disinterested altruistic reasons, 95 but for the ability to gain a return benefit of some type. If this is true, then taxpayers contribute to those charitable organizations which return benefits to them. Studies substantiate this view, finding that the type of charitable organizations supported varies by income level, with high-income taxpayers providing their government-subsidized support primarily to cultural institutions, and low-income taxpayers providing their unsubsidized support to religious institutions and community welfare agencies. 96 Not surprisingly, studies indicate that wealthy taxpayers disproportionately benefit from services provided by the cultural charities such as museums, public television, and symphonies to which they allocate public money. 9 7 Correspondingly, lowincome taxpayers donate to religious institutions and social-welfare organizations because they view those organizations as more likely to respond to their needs:
[M]utual-aid associations and churches, both characterized by aid or assistance among members, have high components of reciprocal giving. According to this view, philanthropy and everyday helping 9 The law properly limits one's ability to enjoy a direct benefit in return for a contribution. See Rev. Rul. 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69 (stating that a deduction will be disallowed if the donor receives a benefit in exchange for the contribution). The reciprocity referred to here involves the much more indirect practice of taxpayers funding those organizations whose services they enjoy. Taxpayers who fund public television because they enjoy watching public television, or fund the symphony because they enjoy classical music are such examples.
94 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 37. 
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behavior are part of an informal mutual insurance pact ....
[P]eople act charitably for the same reason they buy insurance.
[T]his kind of giving brings the benefit of potential return aid
98
Lower-income American's support of their local religious congregations and social-welfare organizations, such as the Salvation Army, represents a form of enlightened self-interest, supporting those organizations which are most likely to offer a helping hand during difficult times, enjoying, like their higher-income counterparts, reciprocal benefits for their charitable giving. The ability to enjoy some reciprocal services for one's charity is an inevitable and acceptable aspect of private philanthropy.
Unfortunately, the current deduction subsidizes only the reciprocal benefits of highincome Americans.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. A Matching Grant
One possible way to confront the inequitable allocation of power is to replace the current system with a system of matching grants. Under a matching-grant system, "[e]ach donor's gift would be matched by a predetermined amount from the government, the federal share to be transmitted directly to the charitable institution of the donor's choice."
99 For instance, each individual contribution of $100 to a designated charity would allocate a federal matching grant directly to that charity in the amount of 20% or $20.100 Like a credit, such a system would have the benefit of eliminating the inequitable distribution of the subsidy because it would be in no way tied to income levels. On the other hand, a matching grant would create other problems not associated with a credit. It has the potential to eliminate or deteriorate the benefits of cultural pluralism, raise constitutional issues involving subsidies to religiously affiliated 98 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 37-38. 100 The percentage needed to maintain the current level of total giving under a matching grant system perhaps needs to be higher than that of a credit, given the potential loss of the efficiency provided by a tax expenditure. See supra part II.C.3; infra part IV. A.3. institutions, and cause inefficiencies associated with an indirect subsidy.
Cultural Pluralism
One concern about a matching grant program is the possible effect on the benefits of the pluralistic nature of the subsidy. The fear is that the process of deciding which charitable organizations qualify for deductible contributions might become overly politicized. The IRS, which now makes these decisions, has proven quite evenhanded and effective in its administration of the task. A system where government directly funds the organization, as opposed to inducing the individual to do so, would likely be more susceptible to political intervention and opportunism than the current tax deduction. Subsidizing charitable organizations through a tax expenditure is more protective of the privacy of individual donors and their choices of to whom to donate:
When a donor takes a tax deduction for a charitable contribution his privacy is an inextricable part of the more generally protected privacy that is accorded to federal income tax returns. Thus, an attempt to breach it-for example, on the theory that deductions are equivalent to expenditures and that the public is entitled to know who is controlling the destiny of these hypothetical public funds-would be seen as a threat to the privacy of everyone's tax return .... 103
C. A Refundable Credit
The Proposal
This Comment proposes that the current system utilizing deductions should be replaced with a refundable tax credit, which provides an equal subsidy across income levels, similar to the system of matching grants. The credit should be equal to the amount of qualified charitable contributions times a revenue-neutral percentage level. For the sake of example, this Comment assumes the percentage to be 20%.127 In our example, this means that the treatment of each taxpayer's $100 donation is identical. Each is entitled to a 20% tax credit for the amount of their contribution. The decrease in the cost of giving causes each taxpayer in our example to increase his or her donation to $159,128 and entitles each to a tax credit of $32. 129 Noted empirical studies which have examined this issue indicate that a shift to a revenue-neutral credit would not create a change in the total amount of charitable giving, since the price elasticity of giving appears to be constant across income levels.
0
If price elasticity is constant across income levels and the level of the credit is chosen to keep the revenue cost at the same amount as the 127 Twenty percent is a rough estimate of the level of credit necessary to maintain the revenue cost at $17 billion. See supra note 2. The preceding studies cited examine the effect of a 25% credit, but such studies were conducted prior to the 1986 Act's reduction in rates. See infra note 130. It seems likely that a lower credit would currently be necessary to maintain revenue neutrality. The government should and would study the revenue impact in determining the level of credit necessary to maintain the current revenue cost of the tax expenditure.
128 This represents a 27% increase in the net cost of their donations from $100 to $127 ($159 donation minus the $32 credit), since each taxpayer has a price elasticity of roughly 1.35 (27% increase in charitable contribution divided by a 20% reduction in the price of the contribution).
12' The $32 refund is computed by multiplying the $159 charitable contribution by the 20% tax credit.
130 See Feldstein, supra note 96, at 209-10 ("[T]he econometric evidence indicates that the price elasticity of giving ... does not differ significantly among income groups. .. ."); Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101 n.54 ("The data reveal that price elasticity ... does not vary significantly through a wide range of incomes."). Nevertheless, these studies are by no means conclusive, and substantial disagreement does exist over the price elasticity for taxpayers at different income levels. See e.g., CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 66-71 (ultimately concluding that "It]he evidence summarized here provides no firm conclusion regarding the important issue of variation in the price elasticity by income level"). The likelihood of a small or nonexistent difference in price elasticity seems strong enough to support changing to a credit without significant concern about a decrease in aggregate giving. current deduction (that is, a revenue-neutral change) then total aggregate giving will be unchanged. 1 3 1 "[T]he substitution of a ... credit would yield approximately the same total aggregate giving at the same revenue cost as the current deduction, even though the credit would present the same cost of giving to all taxpayers." 1 3 2
In our example, this means that net cost to government-the revenue loss-stays at $85, while maintaining the total subsidy to charitable organizations at an amount of $147, and the total aggregate giving at $547. 133 Though a shift to a credit would not change the total aggregate level of charitable giving, it "would have a dramatic impact on the distribution of contributions," that is which organizations are funded, and by whom.
13 4 Every American across all income levels would have a say in the allocation of the $17 billion government subsidy to charitable organizations. Each American would be able to participate in this "form of self-government" by "saying with his or her dollars what needs should be met, what objectives pursued, what values served." 135 In our example, this means that the treatment of each individual is identical. 13 6 Each would be entitled to a 20% credit for the amount of their contribution. The government would subsidize equally 137 the decision of Taxpayer I to support his local 131 Because the sensitivity to the net price of giving is constant across income levels, "the total cost in terms of foregone tax revenue is essentially independent of the method used to stimulate contributions." Feldstein, supra note 96, at 210.
132 Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101 n.54. 133 Actually, following through in the example results in a revenue loss to the government of $43 (a $32 credit for each of the four taxpayers of $128 less the existing $85 revenue cost), an increase in the subsidy to charity of $236 (a $59 increase in each of the four taxpayer's donations), and an increase in total aggregate giving to $89 (a $159 donation from each of the four taxpayers of $636 less the existing level of $547). This revenue loss of the proposal and the increase in the amount of charitable giving results from the decision to include within the example a disproportionate amount of lower-income giving in order to demonstrate the effect of different possible changes in the law on these lower-income taxpayers. Thus, the decrease in charitable giving and corresponding tax savings for those taxpayers facing the 28% and 31% marginal tax rates is understated in the example and the increase in giving and corresponding revenue cost of lower-income taxpayers facing a zero and 15% marginal tax rate is overstated, causing our example to, in total, overstate the net revenue loss and the increase in charitable giving.
13 Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101.
135 GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 57, at 123.
13'
Keep in mind the caveat of supra note 23, regarding the ability of high-income taxpayers to designate a larger subsidy through their ability to contribute larger amounts.
137 The amount of the subsidy is $59 (the $159 donated after the credit as compared to the $100 donated without the subsidy), at a cost to the government of
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entirely clear), fair, even-handed administration of the question of which organizations qualify for the credit would be maintained, because the IRS would continue to decide this question under a credit system.
47
Likewise, an individual's contribution would continue to receive the "privacy that is accorded to federal income tax returns," under a credit system.
148
CONCLUSION
The current tax preference granted an individual's charitable contribution is properly viewed as a mechanism to provide government support to charitable organizations. The provision of a public subsidy through the tax system efficiently provides support in a manner that ensures cultural and religious pluralism. The historical development and expansion of the standard deduction and the progressive tax structure, however, have created a system which predominantly subsidizes the charities favored by high-income taxpayers. This Comment has considered alternatives to the current inequitable plutocratic allocation of power and proposes a refundable tax credit to replace the current deduction. The tax credit will greatly reduce the inequity of the current system while maintaining revenue cost and aggregate giving at current levels.
